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Abstract: 
Econometric Estimation of the Magnitude of Market Power 
in the Soymeal Export Market 
In this paper, an estimate of the degree of imperfect competition in the market for 
soymeal exports is derived using a structural econometric model. The procedure consists of 
estimating a demand function and the industry first-order profit-maximization condition, from 
which an estimate of the degree of imperfect competition can be retrieved. Using a nonlinear 
three-stage least squares procedure, the estimate of market power shows that the world market 
for soymeal exports is perfectly competitive. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past fifteen years industrial economics has seen a resurgence of interest in the 
conduct of empirical analysis, an activity which is now commonly referred to as the "new 
empirical industrial organization" (NEIO). This new empirical research has developed largely 
due to dissatisfaction with the older structure-conduct-performance (SCP) methodology that 
dominated empirical work in industrial organization during the 1960s and 1970s (Bresnahan and 
Schmalensee, 1987; Bresnahan, 1989). Typically studies in the NEIO use time-series data from 
a single industry to estimate structural econometric models based on firm-level optimization 
behavior in order to determine market outcomes. Essentially, the approach is aimed at 
evaluating the presence of market power in a specific industry based on the specification of 
demand and cost functions and hypotheses concerning the strategic interaction of firms, things 
which studies based on the SCP approach generally failed to specify. 
Of the various applications of this new methodology to the food and agricultural sector, 
only a few relate to export markets, for example, Buschena and Perloff (1991), coconut oil 
export market; Karp and Perloff (1989, 1993), rice and coffee export markets; Lopez and You 
(1993), Haitian coffee exporting; and Deodhar and Sheldon (1995), German banana imports. 
In the context of the NEIO, estimating the degree of imperfect competition in international 
markets is a logical extension of the methodology, however, it takes on further importance in 
the light of recent developments in international trade theory (Help man and Krugman, 1985, 
1989). 
The defining feature of the "new trade theories" is the explicit assumption that trade can 
be characterized by markets that are imperfectly competitive, an assumption that has generated 
three basic predictions: first, scale economies can lead to specialization and export in 
2 
monopolistically competitive markets, e.g. Helpman and Krugman (1985); second, oligopolistic 
markets can provide a rationale for activist trade policies such as export subsidies and taxes, e.g. 
Brander and Spencer (1985); third, imperfect competition can affect the gains from trade 
liberalization, e.g. Smith and Venables (1988), and, different trade instruments can have 
differential welfare effects when markets are oligopolistic, e.g. Krishna (1989). These 
developments suggest there are additional reasons why it matters to verify empirically that an 
international market(s) is(are) imperfectly competitive. In this context, therefore, the objective 
of this paper is to estimate the degree of imperfect competition in the market for soymeal 
exports, using a structural econometric model based on a model originally suggested by 
Bresnahan (1982). This is an interesting agricultural export market to analyze due to the fact 
that, in contrast to previous studies, soybean processing is an industry where firms from both 
developing and developed countries are competing with each other. 
It should be noted that an earlier study by Yamazaki, Paarlberg and Thursby (1992) did 
evaluate competition in the soybean processing industry using a model that allowed retrieval of 
a value for an aggregate conjectural variations1 parameter for the industry which suggested that 
the export market is perfectly competitive. However, Yamazaki et al. used a simple non-
stochastic computable partial equilibrium model which does not allow for the calculation of 
standard errors for the estimated degree of market power\ unlike the present study. In 
addition, the previous study did not separate the markets for processed soybean products, 
soymeal and soyoil. Although these are obtained simultaneously in the processing operation, 
1 Conjectural variations are an index of the beliefs that firms' have about the response of other firms to their 
actions. 
2 See Sheldon (1992) for a discussion of the use of this type of model. 
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soymeal and soyoil are sold in virtually independent markets, having a single identifiable world 
market for each of them (Uri, Chomo and Hoskin, 1993). Hence, the present study focuses on 
the degree of competition in the soymeal export market3. 
Given the basic objective, the remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 gives background information on the structure of the world soymeal export market, while 
section 3 describes the econometric methodology followed in the paper. Essentially, the degree 
of imperfect competition in the international market is calculated by estimating a demand 
function and the industry first-order profit-maximization condition, from which an estimate of 
the degree of imperfect competition can be retrieved. Section 4 describes the data used, and 
reports the results of the econometric analysis, while Section 5 summarizes. 
2. Soym.eal Export Market Structure 
The soymeal export market is a major agricultural export market, world demand for 
soymeal deriving mostly from the demand to feed livestock and manufacture food products, a 
demand that has been growing constantly due to ever increasing world per-capita incomes and 
population. The world market for soymeal exports has increased rapidly from less than three 
million tonnes in 1966 to approximately 29 million tonnes in 1994, an increase of more than 800 
percent (American Soya Association). Soymeal production is an extremely valuable part of 
soybean processing, 80 percent of the value of soybeans being derived from the soymeal market 
(Larson and Rask, 1992). In addition, soymeal holds a dominant position in the protein meal 
3 An initial attempt was made to conduct a similar study on soyoil, however, it was dropped due to data 
problems. Specifically, there is not enough variability in the quantities of soyoil exports to allow estimation of a 
demand function, and data on the prices of an important substitute product, rapeseed oil, were not available for the 
entire period used in the study. 
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market, accounting for more than 60 percent of the world market in 1994, there being no major 
competing substitutes (American Soya Association). 
In terms of the geographic structure of soymeal exports, Larson and Rask report that 
more than 95 percent of world exports are accounted for by four countries/country blocs, namely 
Argentina, the European Union (EU-12), the U.S. (20 percent each), and Brazil (35 percent). 
Argentina is a relative newcomer which began exporting during the mid-1970s, growing from 
a 2 to a 20 percent share of the world market over the period 1980 to 1990, largely at the 
expense of the U.S. and Brazil. Larson and Rask suggest that Argentina and Brazil have a 
relative competitive advantage in the sector partly due to lower soybean production costs, but 
also due to the use of differential trade instruments designed to promote the export of processed 
soybeans. 
On the face of it, the extent of country participation in the global trade of soymeal 
suggests that the export market might be characterized by oligopolistic behavior\ however, 
closer analysis of the market structure of soybean processing gives no clear empirical indication 
as to whether or not this market is imperfectly competitive. In the case of the U.S., soybean 
processing is relatively concentrated. Marion and Kim (1991) report that between 1977 and 
1988, the largest four firm's share of soybean crushing capacity rose from 46 to 76 percent, with 
the largest two firms, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) and Cargill taking just over 50 percent. 
This increase in market concentration has come about largely through mergers and acquisitions, 
although crushing capacity also declined over the same period as firms have concentrated 
4 There has been a tradition in the agricultural trade literature to focus on the competition between countries 
that dominate the export of certain agricultural commodities, the classic example being the series of papers published 
on trade in wheat: McCalla (1966); Alaouze, Watson and Sturgess (1978); Karp and McCalla (1983); Kolstad and 
Burris (1984). 
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capacity in larger scale plants. Similarly in the EU, soybean crushing is highly concentrated. 
Scoppola (1995) reports that, in 1988, the four-firm concentration ratio for the EU was 85 
percent, all of which was accounted for by multinational corporations. For example, Cargill 
operates plants in France, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, while ADM has a plant in the 
Netherlands. In contrast, while there is also multinational involvement in Brazil and Argentina, 
their soybean processing industries are considerably less concentrated, with the largest four firms 
accounting for 27 and 39 percent of crushing capacity respectively in 1994 (American Soya 
Association). In addition, processing capacity has expanded in both countries since the 1970s 
(Larson, 1992). 
Hence, while the geographic location of the soybean processing is heavily concentrated, 
and there is evidence of multinational involvement, the structure of the industry cannot be 
unambiguously described as oligopolistic in structure. In addition, while studies have shown that 
this industry is characterized by scale economies due to large fixed costs in processing (U.S. 
International Trade Commission, 1987), there also seems to be chronic excess capacity in the 
industry which would tend to undermine firms' ability to extract monopoly rents. For example, 
a 1988 USDA study shows that capacity use in Brazil during the mid-1980s was only 55 percent. 
3. Methodology for Estimating Market Power 
Most industrial organization economists agree that the appropriate measure of the extent 
of market power is the gap between price (P) and marginal cost (MC), i.e., the ability of a 
firm/industry to raise price above marginal cost. A unitless measure of this is the well-known 
Lerner index: 
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(1) 
In principle, this index could be measured directly, however, detailed information about 
marginal costs is rarely, if ever, available. Most research in the SCP tradition has, therefore, 
adopted a proxy for the Lerner index originally introduced by Collins and Preston (1969) that 
uses average variable cost rather than marginal cost. However, except for competitive firms in 
long-run equilibrium, average (variable) cost is not a good approximation to marginal cost. An 
alternative index, Tobin's q, defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement 
cost of its tangible assets, should, on average, equal one under competitive conditions. If, 
however, intangible assets are large and are ignored in the valuation of the firm, then Tobin's 
q can exceed one even in the absence of market power. Measures of profits and rates of return 
are also poor substitutes for the price-cost margin as they are based on accounting definitions 
of cost, employ arbitrary depreciation rules, and do not treat the cost of advertising and research 
and development reasonably. Fisher and McGowan (1983) indicate that the time profile of the 
benefits derived from investments, depreciation methods used, and the growth rates of the firms 
differ among firms, hence, the comparison of accounting rates of return is misleading. 
The NEIO has evolved partly due to dissatisfaction over these measurement issues 
(Bresnahan, 1989; Perloff, 1992). This literature has grown in several different directions, the 
variety reflecting the differences in the availability of data and the institutional details of the 
industries. The approach followed in this paper is based on a model suggested by Bresnahan 
(1982), and also utilized by Buschena and Perloff. The aim is to estimate an industry-wide, 
average parameter of market power, using a standard structural econometric method. 
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Suppose market demand in a given industry is given by the implicit function: 
(2) 
where Qt is the total quantity demanded, Pt is market price, ~ is a vector of exogenous 
variables, and t is a time subscript. Since Qt and Pt are simultaneously determined, the demand 
function can also be written in inverse form, Pt = P(Qt, ZJ. Industry revenue is defined as, Rt 
= PtQt, hence, perceived marginal revenue {M~(A)} is given by the expression: 
(3) 
where A is the market power parameter reflecting the wedge, in equilibrium, between price and 
marginal cost. Nested in A will be an index of the beliefs that firms have about other firms' 
reactions to their output choices, i.e. a conjectural variations parameter. In equilibrium, M~ 
will equal marginal cost MCt> which can be written as: 
(4) 
If firms demonstrate either Bertrand-Nash or perfectly competitive behavior, the parameter A 
will turn out to be 0, and (4) becomes the usual profit maximizing condition that price must 
equal marginal cost. If firms demonstrate perfectly collusive behavior, the value of A will be 
1, and A will take the value 1/n if then firms in the market behave in Cournot-Nash fashion5• 
The empirical procedure adopted to estimate the degree of imperfect competition in the 
soymeal export market is as follows. The world export demand function in (2) is specified as 
a linear equation of the form: 
(5) 
s See Deodhar and Sheldon (1995) for a discussion of the connection between the market power parameter A. 
and the concept of conjectural variations. 
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where Qt is the quantity of soymeal sold in the export market, Pt is the real soymeal price, Zm 
(n=1,.,3) are exogenous variables (defined explicitly in Section 4), and e1 is the error term, 
where e1 is N(,u,ul). In addition, suppose that the aggregate marginal cost of production takes 
the following functional form: 
(6) 
Marginal cost is assumed to vary with respect to output Qt, and W nr. (n = 1,. ,3) are proxies for 
the real input costs of producing soymeal. No constant term is included in the functional form 
since there will be no variable costs at zero output. 
Equation (6) can now be substituted into the profit-maximizing condition (4). Re-
arranging terms, the following equation is derived: 
pt = 'Yt Qt + 'Yz Wlt + '}'3 W2t + 0 [ Qt ] + Ez 
at + asZ3t 
(7) 
where the variables are defined as above, and e2 is N(,u,ul). The market power parameter in this 
equation is nothing but the coefficient o with a negative sign, i.e., A = -o. 
It should be emphasized here that the market power parameter cannot be estimated if the 
cross-product variable, PtZ317 is not specified in the demand function. As described by 
Bresnahan (1982), since marginal cost data are not readily available, rotation of the demand 
function around the equilibrium point can trace out the supply relation, which allows calculation 
of the degree of market power. If no cross-product variable is included in the demand function, 
the coefficient of Qt in equation (7) reduces to (-y1 +O/a1), and, hence, an identification problem 
occurs for o as -y1 and o cannot be estimated separately. This problem does not arise if marginal 
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cost is constant with respect to output (see Bresnahan, 1982), however, in this study it is 
assumed that marginal cost varies with respect to output. 
4. Data and Regression Analysis 
In order to evaluate the degree of market power, equations (5) and (7) are estimated. 
In its complete form, (5) is specified as: 
Qt and Pt are as already defined; Zit is the real price of a key substitute product, fishmeal. 
Fishmeal was chosen over other protein meal substitutes due to fishmeal having been the second-
largest traded protein meal in the world, and data were available for the time-period of this 
study. Z2t is the rest of the world (ROW) population that excludes the population of Argentina, 
Brazil and the U.S. Although the EU-12 has become a major exporter of soymeal, its 
population is included because there is a certain amount of intra-EU trade in soymeal (Crowder 
and Davison, 1989). Similarly, Z3t is an index of the gross domestic product of the ROW. T 
represents a trend variable and D 1 is a dummy variable that takes into account the exogenous 
price increases that occurred in 1973 due to the oil shock. It takes a value of one for 1973 and 
zero otherwise. 
Similarly, equation (7) in its complete form is specified as follows: 
The additional variables Wlt and W2t are the real soybean price, and the real average ocean 
freight rate respectively. Until 1974, the world export market for soymeal was dominated by 
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Brazil, the EU-12, and the U.S. However, since 1975 Argentina has increased its market share 
which, by 1990, had reached more than 20 percent. In order to see if there is any structural 
change in the degree of market power after Argentina entered the world export market, the 
coefficient o is expressed as a linear function of a structural dummy: 
(8) o = o0 + o1 D2 
D2 is the structural dummy which takes a value of zero prior to 1975, and one since 1975, 
indicating Argentina's entry to the export market. This implies that prior to Argentina's entry 
into the export market, o=o0, therefore, the market power parameter /\=-o0. After Argentina's 
entry, o=oo+ol> therefore, 1\.=-(oo+ol). 
The variables used in the estimation procedure are summarized and described in Table 
1. Annual data on aggregate quantities of world soymeal exports (QJ were collected for the 
period 1966 to 1990 from a USDA staff report (Crowder and Davison). Prices of soymeal (PJ, 
fishmeal (Z1J and soybean (W 11) were collected for the same period from various issues of the 
USDA publications: Oilseeds and Products, World Oilseed Situation and Outlook, and Oilseeds: 
World Markets & Trade, and from various issues of the FAO publication: Production Yearbook. 
Data on ocean freight rates (W2J were collected from various issues of the F AO publication: 
Trade Yearbook. Population figures (Z2J were constructed from a USDA staff report (Urban 
and Nightingale, 1993). Similarly, indices for gross domestic product were constructed from 
the UN publication: Trends in International Distribution of Gross World Product (1993). The 
deflator used for deflating the nominal variables was collected from the IMF publication: 
International Financial Statistics (1992, 1994). 
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Since equations (5 ') and (7 ') represent a nonlinear simultaneous equations system, they 
were estimated using a nonlinear three-stage least squares (N3SLS) procedure. All the 
exogenous variables in the system were used as instruments for the purpose of estimation. The 
results of estimating these equations are shown in Table 2. In the demand regression, soymeal 
and fishmeal prices have their expected signs. While the positive coefficient of the variable PtZ3t 
dampens the strong negative magnitude of the soymeal price coefficient, it also offsets the 
negative coefficient of the income variable. Further, the population variable has a statistically 
insignificant impact on demand. In the first-order condition regression, soymeal exports has a 
negative coefficient implying that marginal cost is decreasing. The positive coefficients of 
soybean price, and ocean freight rate are consistent with their expected effect on marginal cost. 
The relevant coefficients for calculating market power are 50= -0.03 and o1 = 0.03. Both the 
coefficients are statistically different from zero at 10 percent, using a one-tail test, however, they 
are so close to zero that testing this at any stricter significance level is inconsequential. 
The results show that, even before Argentina's entry, the world export market was 
extremely competitive (}1.=0.03). The effect of Argentina's entry is negligible, but it certainly 
reinforces the status of this industry as a perfectly competitive one (}1.=0). As noted earlier, the 
world market for soymeal exports has been virtually dominated by three to four countries, 
hence, the temptation to argue that the market will be oligopolistic in structure. However, the 
econometric results run contrary to this circumstantial evidence. Indeed, the nature of 
competition in this market need not be determined solely by the number of countries 
participating in the export market. 
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5. Surnnnnary 
Recent developments in trade theory are based on the key assumption that international 
markets are imperfectly competitive. In this context, the aim of this paper has been to evaluate 
the magnitude of market imperfection in the world market for soymeal exports, an industry 
where firms based in developed countries are competing with those from developing countries. 
An earlier study by Yamazaki et al. has shown this market to be perfectly competitive, however, 
their study used a calibration method to measure the degree of competitiveness such that no 
statistical confidence can be attached to their results. In contrast, the present study has used a 
structural econometric model originally proposed by Bresnahan (1982) in order to estimate the 
degree of market power in the soymeal export market. The results presented in this paper show 
that the world market for soybean exports is perfectly competitive, which does confirm the 
earlier result of Yamazaki et al.. While this single result does not constitute a refutation of the 
new trade theory, it does underline the importance of careful empirical analysis of market 
structure and behavior before orthodox trade models are abandoned. 
Table 1: Description of Variables·. 
Variable Description 
Pt Real price of soymeal at the port of Rotterdam: $/tonne cif 
Q1 Total world soymeal exports: thousand tonnes/annum 
Zu Real price of fishmeal at the port of Hamburg: $/tonne fob 
Z21 World population except that of Argentina, Brazil & U.S. 
Z31 Index of world gross domestic product except Argentina, Brazil 
& u.s. 
Wlt Real price of soybean at the port of Rotterdam: $/tonne cif 
W2t Real ocean freight rate, Average of Argentina-Rotterdam and 
U.S.-Rotterdam rates: $/tonne 
Dl Oil shock dummy: 1 for 1973, 0 otherwise. 
D2 Dummy for Argentina's entry: 0 until 1974, 1 since 1975. 
T Time Trend 
t 1966-1990 
"' All variables except dummies are expressed in logarithmic form. 
Table 2: N3SLS Estimation of the Model. 
Soymeal Export Demand 
Intercept 
Real soymeal price: Pt 
Real fishmeal price: Ztt 
ROW population: Z2t 
ROW income: Z3t 
Price times income: Pt~t 
Oil shock dummy: D 1 
Trend: T 
R-square between observed & predicted: 
Durbin-Watson statistic: 
First-order condition 
Soymeal exports: Qt 
Real soybean price: Wtt 
Real ocean freight: W zt 
Oo 
ot 
Oil shock dummy: D 1 
Trend: T 
R-square between observed & predicted: 
Durbin-Watson statistic: 
** Statistically significant at 0.05 level, 2-tail test 
* Statistically significant at 0.05 level, 1-tail test 
***Statistically significant at 0.10 level, 1-tail test 
Coefficient 
59.42* 
-9.92** 
0.40** 
-0.72 
-10.32* 
2.21 ** 
0.29*** 
0.23*** 
0.98 
1.83 
-0.35* 
1.25** 
0.13 
-0.03*** 
0.03*** 
-0.43* 
0.44** 
0.62 
2.48 
t-Ratio 
1.73 
-2.21 
2.17 
-0.19 
-1.71 
2.21 
1.56 
1.41 
-2.03 
8.82 
0.86 
-1.35 
1.39 
-1.84 
2.12 
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